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Abstract
This article consists of a comparative study, on an 
international level, among the organizational structures of 
legislative houses and the strategic management practices 
adopted by these institutions. This comparative research 
is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques. Different maturity levels of management 
practices and large heterogeneity among organizational 
structures were identified. Limitations for generalizing the 
results are due to the accidental sampling approach used. 
The practical results presented come from a proposed 
model for evaluation of institutional maturity level 
concerning management practices. This model is supposed 
to be helpful for parliaments’ management improvement.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to conduct an international level 
comparative study of organizational structures in 
legislatures and also the strategic management practices 
adopted by these institutions. The experiences from 
Chambers of Deputies (or equivalents) and Senates (or 
equivalents) were reported. 
The justification for this study arises from the growing 
expectation—or from the demand in some cases—that 
actions in the public sector must be capable of responding 
to and anticipating demands from society and moreover, 
that they must be implemented efficiently, effectively, 
transparently and ethically. What has been observed 
is an increasing citizen interest in knowing about and 
monitoring legislative operations and effectiveness in 
addition to increasing institutional controls, specifically 
in relation to the legislative power and its primary 
functions of representing citizens, debating major 
international subjects, legislating and overseeing public 
spending. This translates into greater accountability not 
only concerning what is done, but also how it is done, by 
whom it is done and finally, for whom it is done. In this 
context, strategic management has come to be a necessity 
in the public sector. 
Strategy, transplanted into the public sector and 
particularly into legislative power institutions, is a 
conceptual tool necessary for responding to two essential 
questions: in what direction should the legislative power 
move forward and how people should be mobilized in this 
direction. Mintzberg (1994), when analyzing the existing 
theories on strategy, addressed two prevailing theoretical 
views: the first understands strategy as a problem of 
positioning; the second assumes it is a question of 
perspective. From the view of positioning, the strategy has 
a downwards view, focusing on the exact point in which 
the legislative power encounters the citizen and a view 
from the inside out, which sees existing social demands. 
From this analysis, one comes to a possible proposal for 
a direction in which to move forward. From the view 
of perspective, in contrast, the strategic view is inward, 
focusing on the thoughts of collective and upwards 
strategies, forming a macro-view of legislative power. 
Strategic Management in Legislative Public 
Management: A Comparative Perspective
14Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
This aspect is more potent as a motivational factor. The 
approach of this paper is the strategic management as an 
element in the institutionalization process of parliaments. 
In seeking an institutional approach, this research 
dialogues with the work of Polsby (1968), which 
analyzed the institutionalization process of the United 
States Congress and took the view that the administrative 
organization and institutional configuration affect the 
political system, hence the importance of this study. 
From Polsby (1968, p. 165) came the statement that 
“it is hard—indeed for the contemporary observer, 
impossible—to shake the conviction that the House’s 
institutional structure does matter greatly in the 
production of political outcomes”.
Critically analyzing and understanding the processes 
of strategic management, considering the specificities 
of the legislative branch is important for expanding 
knowledge of administration in legislatures. It is also 
important for identifying trends of legislative power as 
a whole that lack in-depth studies. In general, strategic 
management initiatives in the public sector are associated 
with the executive power. Hence, it is understood that 
such studies may contribute to strengthening the image 
of the legislature as a power that is also concerned with 
the rational use of resources and with the application of 
constitutional principles related to public administration. 
1.  METHODOLOGY
This study is comparative and combines quantitative 
and qualitative techniques. It is based on a structured 
questionnaire organized in two parts. The first part 
contains fields for institutional identification and structural 
analysis of the legislative houses which is a topic little 
explored in literature. The second part has eleven closed 
questions, with the possibility for comments, and focuses 
on the theoretical perspective of the positioning school, 
which in turn deals with issues such as mission, vision, 
objectives and indicators.
271 questionnaires were sent to federal legislative 
houses—chambers of deputies and senates or their 
equivalents—in Portuguese, English, Spanish and 
French, using as a base a list of members from the 
Interparliamentary Union (IPU). 
The focus  of  th is  s tudy is  descr ip t ive ,  wi th 
organization, presentation and systemization of the data. 
The statistical inferences were restricted to the respondents 
and are without the intention to generalize. Discrete 
quantitative variables were the object of univariate 
analysis, such as frequency distribution and descriptive 
measure, in addition to being subject to bivariate analysis, 
such as calculating correlation coefficients (Barbetta, 
2008). Qualitative variables were dealt with statistically 
and presented by means of specific graphs. 
A spatial model was created by the authors with the 
goal of preliminarily identifying the stage of maturity of 
each researched legislative house with respect to planning 
and management actions. The idea emerged from the 
perspectives of the authors concerning the vision and 
action1 concepts. In this sense, the model was based on 
some scenarios that were outlined to identify variables 
which could characterize the institutions in the context of 
planning management:
●  Scenario 1: profile of mechanized bureaucracies 
(Mintzberg, 2003) in legislative houses, highly 
hierarchical and with a wide division of labor. 
This could discourage critical thinking about 
future perspectives (vision) of the institution 
and therefore, seem unnecessary to have a 
plan different from action. In this case, the 
institution would be driven by the inertia of the 
mechanized model. 
●  Scenario 2: in light of the administrative 
difficulties and inefficiency of work processes, 
as well as being aware of the need for change, 
administrators initiate movements for thinking 
about and proposing new paths (vision) for the 
institution, translating them into plans for change. 
However, they are unable to get them off the 
paper (action) because they are still absorbed by 
the culture and by the mechanized bureaucratic 
procedures which counteract the focus on 
results, which the changes are demanding. In this 
context, the plans do not go beyond intent and 
only sail in the perspective of the dream. 
●  Scenario 3: those who have overcome the first 
obstacles of the mechanized model; action 
has gained space. Demands for improvements, 
long repressed, are answered with a surge of 
initiatives, many times disordered and with 
departmental focus, self-centered, which in 
general diverge from the institutional objectives 
(vision). In this scenario, the saying that prevails 
is that “…action without planning is fatal” 
(unknown author), given that valuable resources 
may be allocated to projects of secondary 
importance, despite having a technically refined 
character. Thus, the actions meet the goal of 
maintaining the highly qualified staff active 
(pastime), who tend to propose initiatives which 
enhance their individual specialties and not 
necessarily those of the institution.
●  Scenario 4: t ired of seeing projects sink 
1 Let it be registered that the model was inspired upon two proverbs: 
the first is Japanese and states that “Planning without action is a 
dream. Action without planning is a nightmare”; the second is from 
an unknown author and says that “Planning without action is futile, 
action without planning is fatal”. The authors adapted the proverbs 
to the Cartesian model proposed in this study, which situates the 
organization into quadrants based on the relationship between vision 
and action: “Action without vision is a pastime. Vision without 
action is a dream. Action with vision can change the world”.
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which were invested with so much time and 
resources-a situation not necessarily linked to a 
lack of quality, but to the lack of alignment in 
the institution’s purposes—the administrators 
recognize this need for a convergence of 
efforts, to row in the same direction of the vital 
objectives of the institution. In this context, 
the administrators coordinate work to define 
in detail, to all of the staff, these objectives 
(vision), which need to be well understood and 
pursued by all the staff, with the aid of a plan of 
action rigorously executed and coordinate by 
those responsible. In this way, the institution is 
headed for effectiveness in the actions, reaching 
the transformation  necessary to keep in 
synchronized with the evolution of time and with 
social expectations. 
Two essential elements describe the scenarios 
objectively: vision and action. The proposal presented 
here consists of attributing a ranking to these parameters 
and also to associate them with defined levels of maturity 
for strategic management. Level of maturity is understood 
to be a set of management practices applied in the 
institution, which in this proposal, can be classified into 
four suggested categories:
1.  Inertia: when there is little or no vision and 
action is restricted to the bureaucratic process 
already in place.
2.  Dream:  when the  v is ion  reaches  leve ls 
impossible to be achieved within the existing 
system of action.
3.  Pastimes: when the actions do not reach the 
vision, or there is a lack of definition, or a lack of 
alignment and systemization. 
4.  Transformation: when the actions are coordinated 
and focused on reaching the previously defined 
vision.
Based on the semantic context of the questions asked 
in the questionnaire’s second part, the authors have agreed 
on rank the institutions researched by assigning degrees 
(or weights) of action and vision (ranging among the 
values 0-factor missing, 0.5-factor partially present, and 
1-factor clearly present) to each question (see Table 3 in 
section 2.2). This resulted in a two-dimensional matrix 
that combines the perspectives of vision and action into 
the four suggested categories of maturity level.
We are aware that this is not perfect and that there are 
other ways to study the phenomena. Indeed, it will always 
be the case that the values adopted in every variable will 
be a matter of discussion and the weight of some variables 
will be seen as arbitrary. However, we draw from our work 
and experience as civil servants in a Parliament house.
2.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Given the research procedure adopted—structured 
questionnaire sent without control of the return rate 
(censuses)—it was obtained a non-usual random sample. 
Hence, it is impossible to generalize the results. However, 
this type of approach may be considered valid due to the 
fact that the research involves a small population and 
furthermore, the researcher profile is one of experienced 
civil servants from the legislative power which endows 
them with the capacity to judge whether or not the data 
discovered should be included (Barbetta, 2008).
2.1  Institutional Data
In this section, possible correlations between discrete 
quantitative variables [number of representatives, 
number of staff, and population quantity] raised in the 
questionnaires are investigated.
32 answers from 30 countries (11% of respondents) 
were obtained. By continent, there are 21 European 
countries, six American, two Asian and one African 
country represented. Of these 32 legislative houses, 
13 correspond to unicameral parliaments (Portugal, 
Maldives, Luxembourg, Guatemala, Georgia, Ghana, 
Finland, Estonia, Croatia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Bulgaria 
and Andorra), eight are chambers of deputies (Germany/
Bundestag, Argentina, Bolivia, Canada/House of 
Commons, Slovenia, France, Poland and the United 
Kingdom), seven correspond to the Senate/Upper House 
or Federal Council (Germany/Bundesrat, Belgium, 
Belarus, Canada, Chile, Italy and Japan) and three are 
from countries that have a bicameral system whose 
responses referred to the parliament (Austria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Ireland/Houses of the Oireachtas).
An important feature and object of studies in 
representative democracies (Mill, 1983) is to measure the 
effective capacity of parliamentary representation. One 
of the indicators directly associated with this capacity is 
the relationship between the number of inhabitants and 
the number of elected representatives. An ideal value 
for this relationship is a reoccurring theme in Political 
Science (Manin, 1997; Pitkin, 1972). In the United States 
constitution for example, the principle of one representative 
for every 30,000 citizens was established, but only after 
extensive debate and controversy (Crocker, 2010).
Using the United States constitution as a basis for 
criteria, it may be observed in Table 1 that 11 countries 
(equaling 44% of the respondents) have less than 30,000 
people per representative. This suggests more suitable 
conditions of representation given the convergence of 
interests and capacity for action of a group grows as the 
size of the group diminishes (Olson, 1999)2.
2 Although this study solely observes the criteria used in the 
United States, it must be noted that a more in-depth analysis of 
representativeness should take into account other variables such as 
those related to the electoral system and the political maturity of 
the institutions and the population of the country (PITKIN, 1972; 
GAMA NETO, 2011).
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Table 1 
Survey Data for Chamber of Deputies and Senates or Equivalents
Country Representatives Staff Staff/Representatives Population Population/Representatives
Chamber of Deputies or equivalents
Germany 620 2832 4.57 82,162,512 132,520
Andorra 28 17 0.61 84,614 3,022
Argentina 257 2200 8.56 40,764,561 158,617
Austria 183a 440 1.80 8,413,429 45,975
Bolivia 130b 732 5.63 10,088,108 77,600
Bosnia and Herzegovina 42c 144 2.53 3,752,228 89,338
Bulgaria 240 1164 4.85 7,446,135 31,025
Canada 308 2241 7.28 34,349,561 111,524
Cyprus 56 221 3.95 1,116,164 19,931
Costa Rica 57 ND ND 4,726,575 82,922
Croatia 153 246 1.61 4,395,560 28,729
Slovenia 90 374 4.16 2,035,012 22,611
Estonia 101 234 2.32 1,340,537 13,272
Finland 200 466 2.33 5,384,770 26,923
France 577 1356 2.35 65,630,692 5,417
Ghana 230 476 2.07 24,965,816 108,547
Georgia 137 939 6.85 4,329,026 31,598
Guatemala 158 474 3.00 14,757,316 93,400
Ireland 166d 447 1.98 4,525,802 27,263
Luxemburg 60 83 1.38 515,941 8,599
Macedonia 123 279 2.27 2,063,893 16,779
Republic of the Maldives 77e 136 1.73 320,081 4,156
Poland 460 782 1.70 38,298,949 83,258
Portugal 230 383 1.67 10,689,663 46,476
United Kingdom 650 2832 4.57 62,417,431 96,026
Average 213.3 812.4 3.32 17,382,975 54,621.6
Std. Dev. 179.7 857.7 2.08 23,298,227 44,783.6
Median 158 456.5 2.34 5,384,770 31,598.7
Senate or equivalents
Germany 69 201 2.90 82,162,512 1,190,761
Austria 62a 440 1.80 8,413,429 135,700
Belgium 71 370 5.20 10,754,056 151,465
Belarus 64 77 1.20 9,559,441 149,366
Bosnia and Herzegoina 15b 144 2.50 3,752,228 250,148
Canada-Senate 105 432 4.10 34,349,561 327,138
Chile 38 331 8.70 17,269,525 454,461
Ireland 60c 447 2.00 4,525,802 75,430
Italy 315f 997 3.20 60,788,694 192,979
Japan 242 1312 5.40 126,497,241 522,715
Average 104.1 475.1 3.70 35,807,249 345,016.3
Std. Dev. 96.3 387.5 2.3 4,138,768 330,572.8
Median 66.5 401.0 3.0 14,011,791 221,563.5
Note. Developed by the authors. a. the responses given by Austria refer to the Parliament as a whole, in spite of the system being bicameral. 
The calculations related to staff/representatives were made with respect to the total number of representatives (245) while the population/
representative calculations were made in relation to the number of representatives in each House-183—National Council and 62—Federal 
Council. b. Bolivia recorded the election of 130 members and 130 alternates. c. the Bosnia and Herzegovina situation is similar to that of 
Austria, with 42 representatives in the House of Representatives and 15 in the House of Peoples. d. The situation in Ireland is similar to Austria, 
with 166 deputies and 60 senators. e. Number of members of the Republic of the Maldives Parliament obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union site. f. Population taken from population Source: http://www.ibge.gov.br/paisesat/main.php, on 25-01-12. g. Decimal places disregarded. 
h. Maximum and minimum values highlighted in bold. i. the responses given by Austria refer to the Parliament as a whole, in spite of the 
system being bicameral. The calculations related to staff/representatives were made with respect to the total number of representatives 
(245) while the population/representative calculations were made in relation to the number of representatives in each House-183—National 
Council and 62—Federal Council. j. The Bosnia and Herzegovina situation is similar to that of Austria, with 42 representatives in the House 
of Representatives and 15 in the House of Peoples. k. The situation in Ireland is similar to Austria, with 166 deputies and 60 senators. l. 
Population obtained at http://www.ibge.gov.br/paisesat/main.php, on 25-01-12. e. Decimal places disregarded. m. In Italy, there are 315 elected 
senators. However, according to the Italian Constitution, the Senate may include senators for life, nominated by the President of the Republic 
from among citizens who have honored the country with relevant achievements in social, scientific, artistic and literary areas, in addition to ex-
presidents of the Republic, who become senators for life by law. At the time of this research, there were seven life-long senators.
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The distributions of the variables in Table 1 are 
asymmetrical as illustrated by the box diagrams in 
Figure 1. For this reason, they are better represented by 
the median3 as a measure of central trend. It must be 
stressed that the maximum and minimum values may 
be outliers. For this reason, the data were dealt with in 
boxplots in which the median of the set is represented by 
the horizontal center line in the box, while the lower and 
upper quartiles are represented by the lines which delimit 
the box. The height of the box is an estimate of the overall 
variability of the data, which represents 50% of the 
values. The vertical lines (whiskers) generally represent 
the minimum and maximum.
Figure 1 
Quantitative Variables
The principle of contemporary representative 
democracies preaches proportionality between the 
population (or electorate) of a particular constituency and 
its number of representatives in the Chamber of Deputies 
(Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). In this study, the quantity 
of representatives is not broken down by territorial unit 
within each country. Nonetheless, the relationship between 
the population and representatives may be evaluated and 
it varies from one representative for every group of 3,021 
(Andorra) persons to one for every 158,616 (Argentina). 
Figure 2 illustrates the scatterplot of the number of 
representatives versus the population as an independent 
variable. The linear regression line was also drawn. 
Visual inspection suggests a high degree of association 
between population and the quantity of representatives, 
which is confirmed in Table 2 by calculating Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient.
In terms of the amount of staff, 48% of the Chamber 
of Deputies or equivalents has up to 457 (approximated 
median) staff members. In the case of the relation of staff 
members to representatives (Figure 3a), only Andorra has 
fewer staff members than representatives (0.6), whereas 
3 The median is more robust than the average in the presence of 
outliers (numerical observations distant from the rest of the data) or 
measurements with great variability. It occupies a central position 
in a set of ordered data and has the property of dividing it into two 
equal parts in relation to the number of its elements. It may be stated 
that 50% of the observations are less than or equal to the median and 
the other 50% are greater than or equal to this measurement.
in 48% of the Chamber of Deputies, or its equivalent, has 
about two staff members per representative.
Figure 2 
Representatives vs. Population
Table 2 
Statistical Correlation: Spearman Coefficient (r) and 
Coefficient of Determination (r2)
Representatives 
and Staff
Representatives
and Population
Staff
and Population
Chambers
r = 0.89  p < 0.01
r2 = 0.80
r = 0.80  p < 0.01
r2 = 0.64 *
r = 0.82  p < 0.01
r2 = 0.68
Senates
r = 0.55  p < 0.10
r2 = 0.30
r = 0.77  p < 0.01
r2 = 0.59
r = 0.37  p = 0.29
r2 = 0.14
Note. Developed by the authors. Data are non-normal distribution 
according to Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05) and Spearman Coefficient 
was estimated for correlation analysis. In these cases, the value of p 
is the probability that the correlation coefficient value (r) is due to 
chance. Small values of p (bold style) indicate that r is statistically 
significant. Strong correlation means values between 0.70 and 0.89; 
very strong correlation means values between 0.9 and 1.
The largest Upper Chamber has 315 representatives 
and 80% of the Senates or equivalents thereof have more 
than 400 staff members. The relationship between the 
population and senators (Figure 3b) oscillates between 
one senator for 75,430 people and one for 1,190,761. 
Taking into consideration the median, 50% of the 
senates researched have less than 200,000 people per 
representative. The relationship between the population 
and senators is in contrast with the relationship between 
the population and deputies which was to be expected 
given the characteristics of senatorial houses and the 
fact that senators usually represent the member states 
of a federation and not the population. Therefore, 
representation takes place in a fixed and specific number, 
independently of the state population. 
As for the relationship between staff members and 
representatives, 50% of senates operated with up to three 
staff members per senator. 
Given that the majority of the data obtained is not 
normally distributed (p<0.05), the non-parametric 
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Spearman coefficient was calculated. Also calculated 
was the coefficient of determination r2, which represents 
the fraction of variance that is shared between the two 
variables. 
legislative houses, there is a question about whether or 
not there is a need for having declared objectives given 
that these are constitutionally defined (see the discussion 
Figure 3 
Staff/Representatives And Population/Representatives
The Spearman coefficient points to a significant 
correlation between representatives and population in 
all categories. It was less intense in the case of senates 
and their equivalents, which was to be expected given 
the lack of connection between senatorial representation 
and proxy. The coefficient r2 confirms that the population 
size is a strong explanatory factor of the number of 
representatives, for all of the categories studied. For 
example, it can be said that the population explains 
64% of the number of representatives of chambers; the 
remaining 36% can be explained by other factors such as 
the system of government, culture of the country, etc.
Returning the focus to the representative/population 
relationship, one can observe that the chambers have 
a median approaching the criteria of the United States 
representation. 
2.2  Answers to Questions
Table 3 
Survey Questions Results
Question
Yes No N/A Degree of
C1 S2 C1 S2 C1 S2 Action Vision
1) Are there declared institutional objectives with defined goals, which guide administrative 
actions? 23 8 1 2 1 0 0 1
2) Are the indicators checked periodically? 18 5 5 5 2 0 1 0.5
3) Are the indicators used as instruments for making administrative decisions? 16 6 6 3 3 1 0.5 1
4) Are the institutional objectives and indicators widely communicated in the internal setting? 18 6 4 3 3 1 1 0
5) Are short and long-term action plans formulated to reach the established objectives and goals? 21 6 1 3 3 1 0.5 1
6) Are the plans linked to the term of office of the Governing Body? 10 3 12 6 3 1 0 0.5
7) Are there defined criteria for selecting and prioritizing the actions? 13 6 9 3 3 1 1 0.5
8) Is the work process aligned with the defined objectives? 20 7 2 2 3 1 1 0.5
9) Is there a regular practice of periodic revising of objectives, goals and indicators? 20 8 3 1 2 1 1 1
10) Is the periodic revision done by a specialized area or unit? 14 6 7 3 4 1 0.5 0
11) Has there been at least one example of improvement made in management practices in 
relation to one of the questions from the questionnaire? 18 8 4 1 3 1 1 0.5
1Chamber of Deputies or equivalent
2 Senates or equivalent
Question 1. Are there declared institutional objectives 
with defined goals, which guide administrative actions?
Considering the peculiar institutional character of 
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who specifically mentioned monitoring budget indicators. 
The House of Commons in Canada reported that under 
the Business Plan, the indicators are given to the Clerk’s 
Management Group via a status report, with semi-
annual data on the progress of projects and results of the 
performance measurements established in the Plan. The 
Parliament of Slovenia states that the organizational units 
prepare a work plan or strategy, defining tasks, activities 
and objectives, as well as performance indicators. 
The financial indicators are monitored and measured 
regularly, while the outcome indicators are measured 
periodically, depending on the nature of the task, activity 
or individual project. Qualitative indicators, such as 
those which measure “legislative process support”, are 
measured annually. 
Question 3. Are the indicators used as instruments for 
making administrative decisions?
Despite the high prevalence of positive responses, 
the lack of comments may be considered a symptom of 
too little attention to the subject. The French Assembly 
emphasizes that achieving the goals does not affect 
salaries or promotions, while in the Chilean Senate, 
meeting the targets entails financial incentives to the staff. 
Question 4. Are the institutional objectives and 
indicators widely communicated in the internal setting? 
Of those that responded positively, eight mentioned 
making  use  of  in t rane t / in te rne t  as  a  means  of 
communication (House of Commons, UK; Parliaments 
of Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Belarus National Assembly8 
and House of Representatives of Argentina). The United 
Kingdom House of Commons emphasizes that the 
strategy and corporate plans are on internet and that since 
September, 2011 the performance comparison under “Key 
Performance Indicators” has been shared with the staff 
each month via intranet. An annual report is published 
containing information on performance in relation to the 
outlined goals. The Bolivian Chamber of Deputies and 
Parliament of Ghana mention circular letters pertaining 
to the budget to make official announcements. The 
Congress of Guatemala highlights that it communicates 
to certain hierarchical levels corresponding to their 
functions. Among those who responded negatively, the 
Assembly of the Maldives reported that the institutional 
objectives are not reported to the general public. However, 
information regarding finance, meetings and constitutional 
amendments is published on internet. The Slovenian 
Assembly said that the annual labor program, strategy 
and indicators are not presented in detail to the internal 
staff, but there is sharing of this information with areas 
and sectors. The Canadian House of Commons does this 
by publishing the Multi-Year Business Plan, which allows 
sharing information related to planning among managers 
and staff in various areas and services. 
8 The comments from Belarus concern, above all, legislative information 
that is widely disclosed on the internet to society on the whole.
on this in Guimarães, Schwartz, Souza, Melo & Teixeira, 
2012). Therefore, the expectation was that there would 
only be affirmative answers, even though they refer to 
a constitutional matter. There are schools of thought 
that relativize the importance of goals, “although it is 
typically assumed that a strategy oriented towards goals is 
a necessity in organizational life, it is actually a socially 
constructed necessity, characteristic of a mechanistic 
mindset” (Morgan, 1996, p. 38). This counterpoint stands 
out, above all, given that there are negative answers to 
the question, which forces the conclusion that there are 
legislative houses that exist and operate with there being 
declared institutional objectives (both of the German 
houses—Bundestag and Bundesrat-the Japanese Senate 
and the Parliament of Andorra4).
Of those who responded to the question and also made 
comments, five (Portugal, Poland, Slovenia, Belarus and 
Argentina) indicated constitutional functions as objectives 
of the parliament. The Belgian Senate reported its strategic 
objectives as well as statements regarding their vision, 
mission and values, recurring topics in the adoption of 
strategic management, especially in the approaches of 
schools of design, planning and positioning5.
A few of the commentaries stand out. The Bolivian 
response reports “political” goals openly, which is a 
theme that is usually controversial since it questions the 
possibility of measuring the quality of the legislative 
power through quantitative means: “to meet 100% of 
the requirements of laws, draft laws and requests for 
information”. The Canadian House of Commons stated 
that it has a Multi-Year Business Plan6, which defines 
concrete projects created so that strategic objectives 
are met. This Business Plan establishes “quantitative 
performance metrics to measure success.” The Parliament 
of Ireland has also mentioned having a business plan. 
What was also attested to is that the structure and 
processes allow a correlation with the Executive in 
terms of setting priorities and strategies. The House of 
Commons England cited specific objectives related to 
sustainability, such as “reducing the use of energy and 
water and carbon emissions.”
Question 2. Are the indicators checked periodically?
Intentionally, the question leads to a secondary 
affirmative answer as to whether or not there are 
indicators7. Amongst the Chambers of Deputies or 
equivalents, only 5% responded negatively to the question, 
while in the case of the Senates or equivalents, the 
responses are equally divided.
Of those that responded affirmatively, there were those 
4 Symptomatically, in the comment field, the respondent for the 
Parliament of Andorra wrote down: “no answer possible”.
5 Mintzberg (2010)
6 The objective of this study is not to discuss influences, warranted 
or not, of the private sector on the public sector. 
7 There was a concern in the survey about the restriction on the 
number of issues raised, done for purpose of facilitating a response.
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Question 5. Are short and long-term action plans 
formulated to reach the established objectives and goals?
Twenty-seven parliaments (77%) reported having 
long and short-term action plans in order to achieve 
the strategic objectives, while 11.5% (4) denied having 
them and the same percentage did not answer. Among 
non-responders, the Austrian Parliament reported that 
they are under construction and the Polish Chamber that 
there are no specified documents as such, but in spite 
of this, the administration takes relevant actions. The 
Italian Senate informed that the Directive Commission 
presents guidelines for action that are implemented by the 
competent bodies (Chair or Secretary General). 
Of those who responded affirmatively, two highlighted 
actions related to staff development (Argentine Chamber 
and Maldivian Parliament). The Argentine Chamber also 
noted the fact that they are developing actions in order 
to obtain ISO 9001 certification given that there are 
various parliamentary areas in the certification process. 
The Finnish Parliament explained that each unit prepared 
a plan of action for the following year. In the Bulgarian 
Assembly, the plans are also departmental. The Council 
of the Republic of the National Assembly in Belarus 
speaks of working plans that are monthly or quarterly. 
The Guatemalan Congress informs of developing an 
annual Operative Plan, an annual plan for auditing and 
administrative manuals of operation. Some parliaments 
seek to define plans of action better defined and aligned 
with a strategy: the United Kingdom House of Commons 
emphasized that the corporate business plan and the 
business plans of each department in the House are aligned 
with broader strategic objectives; the Irish Parliament 
explicitly cited alignment between the Strategic Plan and 
the Corporate Business Plan. The National Assembly of 
Slovenia works with a financial planning benchmark, with 
a definition of objectives, expected results and indicators. 
Question 6. Are the plans linked to the term of office 
of the Governing Body?
In all categories, there was a predominance of negative 
responses. This temporal “disconnect” between the action 
plans and the terms of the governing bodies indicates the 
relative independence of administrative actions in relation 
to political configurations. However, the influence of 
politicians on administration in legislative houses is very 
strong, as can be seen by the responses concerning the 
powers and duties of the governing bodies.
Question 7. Are there defined criteria for selecting and 
prioritizing the actions?
Twelve parliaments (35%) report that there are no 
defined criteria for prioritizing actions, four (11%) did 
not respond and 19 (54%) report they select and prioritize 
the execution of actions. Among those who responded 
negatively, the French National Assembly noted that 
even if these criteria are not defined, the managerial 
and administrative actions should ensure consistency, 
as in any public or private organization; the Slovenian 
Assembly highlighted that prioritization took place due to 
the need for effectiveness in legislative procedures and the 
budget restrictions. The Italian Parliament said that there 
are no established criteria; nevertheless they are generally 
identified through administrative action guidelines. 
Amongst those who responded affirmatively, the 
Chilean Senate informed that the main criterion is 
strategic guidelines, similar to the Parliament of Ghana 
in which this prioritization also occurs in accordance 
with the implementation plan of the strategic plan. The 
Irish Parliament has a Management Advisory Committee, 
which selects the appropriate priorities as indicated by 
a cross-functional group of managers. In the Assembly 
of the Republic of Macedonia, priorities are set by 
the strategic action plans and proposed by Assembly 
departments. 
Question 8. Is the work process aligned with the 
defined objectives?
In relation to the question of alignment of the work 
process with the defined objectives, 77% (27 institutions) 
responded affirmatively; 11.5% (4), answered negatively 
and 11.5% (4) did not respond, being that the Austrian 
Parliament said “not yet”, making it clear that they are 
still in the process of doing this. Among the four who 
responded negatively, two of them had stated in Question 
1 that they did not have defined objectives (Japanese 
Senate and the German Bundestag). The Council of 
Andorra and the German Bundesrat, who said there 
were no defined objectives, responded affirmatively to 
this question, being that in the comments, the Bundesrat 
reported “no answer possible”.
The Argentine Chamber mentioned that there are 
norms to address the adequacy of procedures in order to 
coincide with the goals set; the Chilean Senate said that 
they are working continuously seeking the best practices 
for the active alignment of plans, goals and objectives 
specific with the strategic objectives. Moreover, due to 
this they are migrating from one management system 
supported by information technology (such as integrated 
management systems—IMSs), which allows for improving 
the processes, mainly those that are administrative.
Question 9. Is there a regular practice of periodic 
revising of objectives, goals and indicators?
As for the question on the practice of periodically 
revising the objectives goals and indicators, 28 reported 
yes (80%), four (11.5%) said no and three (8.5%) did 
not respond. Among the latter is the Austrian Parliament 
that said that this would begin in 2012. Of those who 
responded negatively, there is the Japanese Senate and the 
German Bundestag in addition to the Croatian Parliament, 
which made no comment and the Polish Chamber, which 
reported that revising happens more in response to 
perceived needs than due to a regularly set period of time. 
Of those who responded positively, there are the 
Council of Andorra and the German Bundesrat, which 
initially stated they had no defined objectives. The 
Andre Sathler Guimaraes; Fabiano Peruzzo Schwartz;
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Canadian Chamber commented that the objectives are 
revised annually by the administration and with each new 
legislature a new strategic plan is prepared. The indicators 
are revised annually as part of the Multi-annual Business 
Plan. This annual activity is also cited by the National 
Assembly of France, the Guatemalan Congress and the 
Parliament of Maldives. The Italian Senate mentions 
yearly revisions by the Internal Budget and Guidelines 
for administrative actions. The Canadian Senate conducts 
such a revision at least every six months, while for the 
Estonian Parliament this period is four years, when new 
development plans possibly with new objectives will be 
outlined. The Parliament of Ghana also mentions a similar 
period when it reported that their last Strategic Plan 2006-
9 ended up being revised and a new plan is almost ready. 
The Irish Parliament mentioned quarterly analyses done 
through detailed revisions of tasks and deliverables. 
These revisions are comprised of internal progress 
revisions in operational areas based on status reports in 
each deliverable using a traffic light approach and cross-
functional revisions, made by the General Secretary, of 
the strategic priorities and global progress.
Question 10. Is the periodic revision done by a 
specialized area or unit?
As for the question on the periodic revision of 
objectives, goals and indicators being done by a 
specialized area or unit, the response was affirmative in 
57% of respondents (20), negative on the part of 28.5% 
(10) institutions and 14.5% (54 units) did not respond. 
Among those who did not respond, the Polish Chamber 
(SEJM) noted that these controls were done as part of the 
work in the Chancellery’s units. The Canadian Chamber 
said that the revision work is coordinated by the Office 
of Corporate Planning, but the changes are carried out by 
operational units. Then there is the Austrian Parliament, 
which seems to be in the process of implementing strategic 
planning, stated that this revision will be promoted by the 
specialized unit in the organizational structure.
As for the negative answers, the Parliament of Ghana 
reported that although there is no specific area, there is a 
Steering Committee designated by the President with the 
responsibility of supervising preparation of the plan, while 
the Budgetary Unit provides administrative support. The 
French National Assembly informed that the directors of 
service have the responsibility of reporting to the Director-
General and the Secretary-General. 
Regarding the affirmative responses, the Argentine 
Chamber reported that it is done by the Governing Board, 
through its three secretariats, which receive reports 
from the respective areas. In the Bolivian Chamber, 
the Division of Planning and the Budgetary Unit are 
responsible. The financial area is also involved in the 
process in the Bulgarian National Assembly, where 
the Department of Internal Auditing provides risk 
management guarantees and the Financial Control Sector 
performs legal control prior to any commitment being 
put into effect or cost realized. In the Canadian Senate, 
the Strategic Planning Office facilitates the process of 
revision; in the Irish Parliament it is the Houses of the 
Oireachtas Commission, which coordinates and facilitates 
the quarterly revision process. Similar procedures are also 
mentioned by the Luxemburg Chamber, in which revision 
is done by the directors, with those responsible for the 
services and also in the Estonian Parliament, where the 
process is coordinated by the research department, but 
with the involvement of all units of the Chancellery. The 
United Kingdom House of Commons mentioned that 
two people in the Office of the Chief Executive assist the 
Steering Committee revising the objectives, goals and 
measuring performance.
Question 11. Has there been at least one example of 
improvement made in management practices in relation to 
one of the questions from the questionnaire?
Regarding the question related to having at least 
one example of an improvement made in management 
practices, 74.5% (26 parliaments) said yes, 11.5% did not 
answer and 14.5% (5) responded negatively. Among those 
who declined are the Japanese Senate, the Croatian and 
Slovenian Parliaments, the Bulgarian National Assembly 
and the German Bundestag. 
Concerning those who did not respond affirmatively 
or negatively, the Polish Chamber noted that management 
practices are submitted to constant improvements in 
several units of the Chancellery in accordance with needs 
and circumstances.
2.3  Strategic Evaluations—Results from the 
Proposed Model
The questions were focused on the theoretical perspective 
and the intention was to demonstrate both the existence 
of a strategy (formalized and made explicit in documents) 
as well the consequences of its execution in the reality of 
legislative houses.
Thereby, the maturity model was proposed to match 
authors’ interests that were not only learning about the 
planning or existence of such actions, but also knowing 
the capacity of legislative institutions to transform plans 
into action. It is known that formulating a plan does not 
ensure its execution. Corporate and government strategies 
fail more due to execution problems than those of 
conception. 
In this sense, weighing the questions regarding 
action and vision gives a panoramic view which helps 
to understand institutions in the context of planning 
management. For example, question 1, which related 
to declared institutional objectives, was classified as 
having more to do with the field of “vision” than that of 
“action”. As for question 2 on the existence of measuring 
indicators, it was classified in both concepts. This is 
because indicators bring both a goal-oriented component 
and verification of its implementation, with greater 
emphasis on the latter. The result is presented in the Table 4. 
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Table 4 
International Scene Score
Name of Parliament
Score
Legend Name of Parliament
Score
Legend
Action Vision Action Vision
Chamber of Deputies or Equivalents Guatemala 7.5 6 GTM
Germany-Bundestag 0 0 DEU_C Ireland 7.5 5.5 IRL_C
Andorra 4.5 2 AND Luxembourg 6 4 LUX
Argentina 7.5 5.5 ARG Macedonia 7 5 MKD
Austria 0 1 AUT_C Maldives (Republic of the Maldives) 6.5 5.5 MDV
Belorus 7.5 6 BY_C Poland 1 1.5 POL
Bolivia 7.5 6 BOL Portugal 7 6 PRT
Bosniaand Herzegovina 7.5 6 BIH_C United Kingdom 7.5 5.5 UK
Bulgaria 5.5 5 BGR Senates or equivalents
Canada (House of Commons) 5 4.5 CAN_C Germany-Bundesrat 4.5 2 DEU_S
Cyprus 0 0 CYP Austria 0 1 AUT_S
Costa Rica 7.5 6 CRI Belgium 2.5 3 BEL
Croatia 3 4 HRV Belorus 7.5 6 BY_S
Slovenia 4 5.5 SVN Bosniaand Herzegovina 7.5 6 BIH_S
Estonia 5 3.5 EST Canada—Senate 7.5 6 CAN_S
Finland 5 4.5 FIN Chile 7.5 5.5 CHL
France 4.5 4 FRA Ireland 7.5 5.5 IRL_S
Ghana 7 5.5 GHA Italy 4 2.5 ITA
Georgia 6 4.5 GEO Japan 0 0 JPN
Note. The column Score is the sum of the weights of each question.
Once the action and vision components were identified 
in the questions, it was then possible to synthesize the 
research data in a compact and visual way; favoring 
the understanding of what is essential as well as a 
comparative-situational analysis of the various legislative 
houses. 
Also taken into account was the element of “logical 
consistency”, having in mind correspondence of the topics 
among the questions. Due to inconsistency, the following 
answer patterns were disregarded:
-No (Question 2) and Yes (Question 3);
-No (Question 9) and Yes (Question 10);
-No (Questions 1 and 2) and Yes (Question 4); 
-No (Questions 1 to 10) and Yes (Question 11). 
Comparing the weights to the responses, the matrix in 
Figure 4 emerges: 
Figure 4 
Comparative Matrix
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The upper right quadrant indicates that there are 
actions in progress (from the strategic management point 
of view) and these are guided by a defined vision. When 
the actions lack this vision, there is a pastime situation 
(lower right quadrant). When there is vision, but the 
actions are still insufficient, the proposals of strategic 
management are not concretely established, remaining a 
dream (upper left quadrant). In the worst case, when there 
are no actions and no vision, it appears as inertia. 
Every model is designed with the intention of 
discovering something about a phenomenon that is 
believed to exist. Whatever this phenomenon may be, 
an explanation is sought from the set of data collected in 
the real world to infer conclusions about what is being 
studied. Therefore, a model is a simplification of reality 
and may result in misinterpretation. It is worth mentioning 
that the model proposed was designed a posteriori9, which 
brings with it some restrictions as to its validity. Given 
that the questions were also developed without having 
the design of the model in mind, logical inconsistencies 
were pointed out, which hinders its application, despite 
proposals for compensation of the distortions identified. 
Finally, in view of the questionnaire’s format (closed 
questions, with space for comments), it is clear from the 
comments that sometimes the response to the question 
could have been different depending on the level of 
accuracy of the respondent. Exemplary of this situation are 
the negative answers in the closed questions accompanied 
by comments such as “we still do not have one, but it will 
be implemented in the coming year”. 
In any case, a new field has been opened to be 
further explored in future studies, with the foresight of 
applying the model a priori, where it is expected that 
one can investigate, for example, how much planning 
and management efforts from the legislative houses are 
capable of generating impacts on society. 
CONCLUSION
The great heterogeneity in the institutional configurations 
of legislatures reveals a healthy feature of institutional 
adaptation. Parliaments submitted to pressure and to social 
control seek out other institutional arrangements, which 
allow them to respond appropriately to their respective 
societies. The path to change is better than living with 
the stigma of inefficiency and uselessness and speeches 
defending dissolution or closure. This finding clearly 
dialogues with the hypothesis from Polsby (1968) that 
administration affects politics.
It remains evident that legislative houses have the 
need to define objectives in addition to their constitutional 
duties. Despite a certain degree of confusion in 
terminology, the parliaments define a host of objectives, 
9 The respondents were neither informed of construction of the 
model, nor of its criteria.
varying from those with highly political connotations 
(meeting 100% of the legal requirements) to others that 
are diffuse and not very accustomed to the specific topic 
of parliaments (sustainability in the operation of the 
parliament). The fact that these objectives are associated 
with indicators and performance goals, and having these 
indicators measured effectively and employed as an aid 
to the decision making process is already a matter that 
is more fluid. This can be concluded from Table 3 and 
considering the high percentage of affirmative responses 
for questions 1, 2, and 3, respectively for Chambers (92%, 
51.5%, and 46%) and Senates (80%, 50%, and 60%).
These results are concerning since they make an 
analytical explanation relatively common in strategic 
management processes plausible-their ornamental 
character (Tullock, 2004).
The communication processes typically reveal a profile 
of mechanized bureaucracies, with formal means prevailing 
(circular letter, portals), hierarchical restrictions, and 
absence of detail, opacity or simply no communication. 
This is also a factor of concern given the importance 
of communication for the twin processes of semantic 
assimilation and engagement in strategic management. 
Plans of action are present in the majority of legislative 
houses researched, showing that there is in fact an attempt 
to coordinate actions. Tellingly, the question with the 
greater degree of controversy (disparate responses) was 
that which inquired about the time linkage between plans 
of action and the orders from the governing bodies. The 
political-technical relationship is a central element in 
public administration as a whole, which assumes peculiar 
contours in legislative houses. The time gap between 
plans of action and governing bodies may be understood 
as a sign of institutionalization (the plans transcend the 
sitting managers). 
As for the effectiveness of the plans to mark the decision 
making process, again there is controversy. There are no 
criteria for selecting and prioritizing actions, although, as 
there are plans, the Plan of Action is the criteria. As was 
argued during the design of the model, the response patterns 
that form logical inconsistencies were annulled. 
Parliaments are institutions and as such, “tend to 
develop their character, structural complexity, norms and 
procedural standards, patterns of leadership, and decision-
making routines over a period of time”” (Copeland & 
Patterson, 1997, p. 5). Given their characteristics and 
their presence at the core of the government, with their 
own teleology, the legislative power is a peculiar field of 
study, particularly in research related to the form of its 
organization and operation. Investing in this field of study 
is to assume that the administrative is interwoven with the 
political and that structures for governing and organizing 
affect political routines and decisions. 
There needs to be advancements in delineating what 
will be legislative public administration. The challenge 
is great because the administrative units of the legislative 
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power are underexposed to popular demands. It is not 
a measure of opacity, but is its very teleological nature. 
While the administrative units of the executive power 
can be clearly associated with a specific type of problem 
resolution or serve social demands, legislative offices are 
entities that are competitive and subsidiary to a political 
body whose main function, in the popular imagination, 
is to produce laws. It is precisely this aspect on which 
popular demand is concentrated upon, which ultimately 
focuses on lawmakers, exempting the administration. The 
absence of clear pressure on administration can lead to 
lenient positions and culminate in a form of meaningless 
and undesirable bureaucracy. 
Strategic management has come to this institution, 
the Parliament, whose management paradoxically, was 
so resistant to opening up to society, to create a sense of 
responsibility. The institution provides a stable foundation 
for the continuation of human activity with a significant 
reduction in the need for decision making. Decisions are 
moments of anguish for humans, used to their origins 
when guided by instinct (pre-made decisions) and living 
in caves (reducing the need for processing environmental 
information). The problem is that the struggle for survival 
tends to enforce organizational methods better adapted 
to thrive in its environment, not necessarily the most apt 
to benefit their environment. Reflections on strategic 
management in parliaments are therefore, welcome. 
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